Ever since the R.T. Mullins and Gavin Ortlund debate on Simplicity (you can find it here), I’ve been thinking about --- not simplicity--- but rather Nicene Trinitarianism. That’s because, from this debate, it was the first time I had ever heard of eternal processions in terms of causality. The Father causing the Son. Yet, apparently, this is common knowledge???
Andrew Hollingsworth, known for his scholarship in Semiotics and Theology, has a new paper out, “The Eternal Relation of Origin, Causality, and Implications for Models of God,” (2023), where he clarifies this point. In it, he identifies cause (αἰτία) as an Aristotelian efficient cause, stating that: “When the scripture teaches that the father begets, or generates, the Son, the patristic fathers understood this to mean that the Father, in his timeless eternity, causes the being and existence of the Son. The same is the case with the doctrinal claim that the Father [with or through the Son] spirates the Spirit.”
Likewise, Joshua R. Sijuwade in his paper, “Grounding Eternal Generation” (2022), also says something similar: that “Constantinople thus affirmed the eternal begetting of the Son as being a generation that is distinct from the creation of spatiotemporal world, and is the means by which the divinity of the Father is communicated to the Son.”
Now if that isn’t proof enough, it seems as if John Feinberg also says the same thing in his book No One Like Him (1999). He writes: “One of the key elements in Eastern theology retained by the Cappadocian Fathers is the idea of the monarchy of the Father. This does not mean that either Son or Spirit are not God, but rather that the Father is seen as the fount, source, or cause of the deity. Hence, Christian theology believes in one God the Father who has an only begotten Son born from him and a Divine Spirit proceeding from him.”
Now I say all this as a preface to what I want to talk about, and that is: Jacob Arminius and the αυτοθεος controversy. Before the Mullins and Ortlund debate, I had thought that Arminius’s Christology was a bit heterodox, but since then, I am no longer convinced that this is truly the case.
My previous view on the matter stemmed from a book called Jacob Arminius: Theologian of Grace (2012) by Keith D. Stanglin and Thomas H. McCall, and a paper by Richard Muller called “The Christological Problem in the Thought of Jacob Arminius.” (1988). (note that Stanglin and McCall cite Richard Muller's 4 Volume Reformed Dogmatics as their source) However, upon careful reading, I have noticed that neither book nor paper outright states that Arminius was heterodox in his views. Unfortunately, I do think that the underlying tone of these works concerning this topic may advocate for such a position, but no matter.
What is important is figuring out what Arminius did believe, heterodox or not. I just so happen to think that his views were always justified as being in line with the pro-Nicene fathers, and that if problems do exist then it probably has more to do with Nicene Trinitarianism than anything else that Arminius wrote. Of course, Muller writes “Arminius’ patristic scholarship left something to be desired…”, so let’s take a look at all this.
In the Declaration of Sentiment Arminius wrote the following (Trans. W. Stephen Gunter):
1) God is eternal and has for all eternity possessed the Divine Essence.
2) The Father is derived from no one, nor is the Divine essence.
3) The Son is from the Father, his Divine essence being from the Father
The Word "God" signifies that he has true Divine essence, but the word "Son" signifies that he has the Divine essence from the Father: therefore, the Son is correctly identified as both God and the Son of God. Since the Son cannot be the Father, he cannot possibly be said to have the Divine essence from himself or from no one. ... We may say that the Divine essence is communicated, but we would not say that God is communicated.”
Clearly, Arminius understood the Father as Father and Son as Son, in so far that they possess the Divine essence as the Father or as the Son. What may be confusing is understanding Arminius’s use of the term communicated, but I think Feinberg is able to help us here. He writes that “Eternal generation of the Son is said to mean that the Father communicates the divine essence to the Son. To communicate the essence means to share it in common.” Thus, if this is what Arminius meant, then it does seem clear that he is advocating for a view in which the Father and Son do share in common the Divine essence, even when “the word “Son” signifies that he has the divine essence from the Father.”
Now, in this source, Arminius did not quote the patristics. That's probably because his speech was more about the lapsarian views, and his audience was not the lecture hall but the laymen. So, I don't see cause for Muller to critique Arminius here by saying his "...patristic scholarship left something to be desired..."
What's more, contra to what Muller seems to suggest, we do find that Arminius does reference the patristics in a letter to Hippolytus. Specifically, he quotes Basil the Great, Gregory, Ambrose, Augustine, and Hilary.
Basil the Great
"According to the habit of causes to those things which are from them, we say that the Father has precedence before the Son. (Ever. lib. 1.)
—because the Son has his [principium] source from the Father. According to this, the Father is the greater, as the cause and the source. Wherefore our Lord also has said, “My Father is greater than I,” that is, because He is the Father. But what other signification can the word “father” have, then the cause and the beginning of Him who is begotten from Him? (Ibid).
The Father is the root and the fountain of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. (Discourse against the Sabellians and Arius.)
When I have said “one essence,” I do not understand two [persons] distinguished from one, but the Son subsisting from [principio] the source of the Father, not the Father and Son from one superior essence. For we do not call them “brothers,” but we confess them to be “the Father and the Son.” But essence is identity, because the Son is from the Father, not made by command, but [manente perfecto, perfecte relucens] while He remains perfect, reflecting perfectly back again the light. But that you may not be able to charge these our assertions against us as a crime, and lest you should say, “He preaches two gods; he announces a multitude of deities;” there are not two gods, neither are there two fathers. He who produces two [principia] original sources, preaches two gods. (Ibid.)
The way of the knowledge of God is, by one Spirit, through one Son, to one Father. And, on the contrary, natural goodness, natural sanctification, and royal dignity [transit] are transmitted from the Father, through the only begotten Son, to the Spirit. Thus we confess the persons [in the Godhead] and at the same time the pious doctrine [Monarchiæ] of the unity is not undermined. (On the Holy Spirit, cap. 18.)
Gregory Nazianzen
The [esse] essence is common and equal to the Son with the Father, though the Son has it from the Father. (Fourth Discourse on Theology.)
How is it possible for the same thing to be greater than itself and yet equal to itself? Is it not, therefore, plain, that the word “greater,” which is attributed to the Father in reference to the Son, must be referred to cause; but the word “equal,” which is attributed to the Son, as to his equality with the Father, must be referred to nature? (Ibid.)
It may indeed be truly said, but not therefore so honorably, that, “with regard to the humanity, the Father is greater than the Son:” For what is there wonderful in God being greater than man? (Ibid.)
Ambrose
Though Christ has redeemed us, yet “all things are of God,” because from him is all the paternity. It is, therefore, of necessity that the person of the Father [præferri] have the precedence. (On 2 Cor. 5:18.)
Augustine
If that which begets is [principium] the original source of that which is begotten, the Father is the source of the Son, because he begets him. (On the Trinity, lib. 5, cap. 14.)
He did not say “whom the Father will send from me,” as He said, “whom I will send from the Father,” that is, plainly shewing the Father to be the source of the entire Deity. (Ibid. lib. 4, cap. 10.)
—Therefore this was said concerning the Father: “He doeth the works;” because from Him also is the origin of the works, from whom the co-operating persons [in the Deity] have their existence: For both the Son is born of Him, and the Holy Spirit principally proceeds from Hire, from whom the Son is born, and with whom the same Spirit is common [illi] with the Son. (Idem, tom. 10, fol. 11, col. 1.)
Indeed God the Father is not God from another God; but God the Son is God from God the Father. But the Son is as much from the Father, as the Father is from no one. (Against Maximinus, lib. 3, cap. 23, col. 2.)
Hilary
There is no God who is eternal and without beginning, and who is God to that God from whom are all things. But the Father is God to the Son; for from Him He was born God. (Lib. 4, fol. 60.)
The confession of the true faith is, God is so born of God, as light is from light, which, without detriment to itself, offers its own nature from itself, that it may bestow that which it has, and that it may have what it bestows, &c. (Lib. 6, fol 87.)
Thus, upon reading these quotes, it seems clear to me that Arminius did derive his trinitarian views from the patristics. Perhaps then, Muller has conflict with Arminius's interpretation? If that is the case, why didn't Muller engage this letter and these quotes- quotes that seem to pair well with Arminius's view? Once again, I find Mullers point to be a bit misleading. Not to mention that this is a letter, not a lecture hall, and thus we shouldn't expect the same level of detail.
Then again (because I want to be fair), perhaps Muller's statement has a view of novelty in mind. For instance, in The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity (2011) Ulrich L. Lehner writes that Arminius “started a controversy that asked the fundamental theological question of what was generated in the generation of the Son, and made clear that the Remonstrants differed from Reformed Orthodoxy…” Specifically, Lehner states that 'Aseity' being communicated to the Son was the novelty introduced by Arminius. He writes that Arminius's "explanation of the Trinity argued that God the Father had aseitas, life in himself. When the Son is begotten, the Father communicates to the Son this essence, and therefore it is the former's exclusive attribute." Like Stanglin and McCall, Lehner cites Muller for this view.
Unfortunately, I am cautious of Lehner’s position, that this view is novel, because I think Muller's tone in his 1988 paper reveals a sense of bias-ness. But honestly, I could be wrong. In either case, I’m always somewhat skeptical when I find everyone sourcing their information from the same scholar, and I am doubly skeptical when there are others who are espousing an opposing view. And that’s exactly what we have here.
After the debate by Mullins and Ortlund, a youtuber known as the Muslim Metaphysician did a critique video against Ortlund explaining his thoughts on Nicene Trinitarianism: that not only does the Father cause the Son, but that such cause means a cause to exist; that the Son doesn’t have aseity from himself, but from the Father (you can find the video here).
In the video the Muslim Metaphysician quotes Athanasius:
“The Son has his being not of Himself but of the Father… So then if the Son’s existence is by nature (physei) and not from intention (ek bouleseos), is he with the Father apart from willing and without the intention of the Father? Of course not! The Son is from the Father by will also, as he himself says, “The Father loves the Son and shows him all things” (John 5:20). For just as [the Father] did not begin to be good consequent upon [a prior[ intention (ek bouleseos), and yet is good not apart from intention and willing- for what he is, he is willingly- so also the Son’s existence, while not having its beginning consequently upon an intention, is nevertheless not apart from willing or the Father’s purpose.”- Against the Arians, Discourse 3, Chapter 30.
He quotes Gregory:
“…And God over all alone has a certain special gnorisma (property) of His own hypostasis: being the Father, and subsisting from no cause, and by this sign again He is also individually recognized.”
“The principle of causality distinguishes, then, the Persons of the holy Trinity. It affirms that the one is uncaused, while the other depends on the cause.” – On Not Three Gods
And he quotes Hilary:
“The father is greater than the Son: for manifestly He is greater Who makes another to be all that He Himself is, Who imparts to the Son by the mystery of the birth the image of His own unbegotten nature, Who begets Him from Himself into His own form…”- On the Trinity 9.54
“He is not the source of His own being… it is from His [the Father’s] abiding nature that the Son draws His existence through Birth…” – On the Trinity 9.53; 6.14; cf. 4.9
Now, all this doesn’t mean that the Muslim Metaphysician is right about Nicene Trinitarianism, or that Arminius wasn’t doing anything novel with his understanding of Nicene Trinitarianism. ---All these quotes are periphery readings after all. ---But, as stated above, I’m just trying to be cautious here. In my opinion, it is clear that Arminius wants to uphold Nicene Trinitarianism, yet how he cashes it out is still up for debate.
If anything, it shows that more scholarship needs to be done. But if my understanding is correct, then Arminius's αυτοθεος controversy doesn't need to be a controversy after all.
Additional Patristic quotes from the Hollingsworth and Sijuwade's papers:
Gregory of Nazianzus (Quote taken from Hollingsworth’s Paper)
“Because they [the Son and Spirit] are from him, though not after him. ‘Being unoriginate’ necessarily implies ‘being eternal,’ but being eternal’ does not entail ‘being unoriginated,’ so long as the Father is referred to as origin. So because they have a cause they are not unoriginated. But clearly a cause is not necessarily [temporally] prior to its effects—the Sun is not [temporally] prior to its light. Because time is not involved, they are to that extent unoriginated—even if you do scare simple souls with the bogey word; for the sources of time are not subject to time”
John of Damascus (Quote taken from Hollingsworth Paper)
“And if we say that the Father is the origin of the Son and greater than him, we do not imply that he precedes the Son in time or in nature, for ‘through him he created the aeons.’ Nor do we imply anything else except causality, which is to say that the Son was begotten of the Father, not that the Father was begotten of the Son, and that the Father is the cause of the Son by nature, just as we do not say that a flame comes from light, but rather that light comes from a flame. So when we hear that the Father is the source of the Son and greater than him, we should understand this in a causal sense."
Origen of Alexandria (Quote taken from Joshua R. Sijuwade’s paper)
“We recognise that God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was indeed born of him and draws his being from him, but is yet without any beginning.” (On First Principles, 1.2.2)
“The existence of the Son is derived from the Father but not in time, nor from any other beginning, except, as we have said, from God Himself.” (On First Principles, 1.2.11)
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